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Jared Burtner*

A Catalyst for Change: Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv.
Committee, ERISA, and the Absence of a Uniform
Loss Causation Standard

In its August 4, 2014 decision in Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Committee, the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, by a two-to-one majority, issued
two rulings significantly impacting ERISA litigation in its jurisdiction.1 First, the
Tatum Court ruled that a breach of the duty of procedural prudence imposed on
retirement account fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) shifts the burden of production from the plaintiff to the defendant
fiduciary to show that the imprudent behavior did not cause loss to the retirement
plan in question.2 Second, the Tatum Court ruled that the standard for evaluating
whether the fiduciary’s breach of prudence caused loss to the plan is whether a
reasonably prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision.3 At the time, the
United States Supreme Court had yet to weigh-in on either issue, making Tatum a
prime catalyst for uniformity in an area of ERISA law either devoid of helpful
precedent or marked by disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals.4
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari to RJR Pension Inv. Committee on June
29, 2015,5 several substantive problems with the Tatum rules suggest that the issues
addressed by the Tatum Court are anything but conclusively resolved and could see
intervention by the Supreme Court in a future case.6
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1. See generally Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2887 (2015) (mem.).
2. Id. at 363.
3. Id. at 365.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.).
6. See infra Part IV.
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This note will present the relevant facts of the Tatum case,7 and then summarize
the state of the law impacting the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals at the time of its
decision.8 After explaining the reasoning of the Court in assigning the burden of
proving loss causation to defendant fiduciaries and adopting a “would have”
standard for evaluating loss causation,9 this note will elaborate on a couple of
significant problems that suggest the Tatum rules could be subject to change in the
future.10 First, despite having no Fourth Circuit precedent guiding the decision,11 the
Tatum Court required the defendant to bear the burden of proof as to loss
causation even though ERISA does not suggest departing from the default rule that
this burden rests with the plaintiff.12 Second, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fifth
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer that fiduciaries are not required to out-guess the
market suggests that the Court would not support the Tatum Court’s “would have”
standard for evaluating loss causation.13

I. THE CASE
On February 25, 2013, the Federal District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina held that retirement plan fiduciaries at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
(“RJR”) breached their duty of procedural prudence under ERISA by selling
Nabisco stock from the RJR Tobacco Capital Investment Plan (“the Plan”) without
undertaking a proper investigation.14 However, the District Court also found that
RJR was not liable to Plan participants because a reasonable and prudent fiduciary
could have made the same investment decision, even after a proper investigation.15
The District Court’s decision came 11 years after Mr. Tatum filed a certified class
action on behalf of all participants in the Plan whose individual retirement accounts
included Nabisco Group Holdings (“NGH”) common stock and/or Nabisco
(“NA”) common stock any time between June 14, 1999 and January 31, 2000.16 The
presence of the two types of Nabisco stock in the Plan became an issue after 1999,

7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding
that “while a failure to investigate is a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty under § 1104(a)(1)(B), causation of loss is
not an axiomatic conclusion that flows from a breach of that duty,” but not adopting a standard by which to
evaluate causation); id. at 220 (declining to determine whether burden of proving causation falls on the plaintiff
or defendant fiduciary).
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471 (2014). See infra Part IV.B.
14. Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (M.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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when RJR Nabisco’s tobacco products subsidiary, RJR Tobacco, spun-off from its
food products subsidiary, Nabisco.17
Corresponding to the spin-off, the original RJR Nabisco retirement plan was
divided into separate plans for the respective employees of Nabisco and RJR
Tobacco.18 Consequently, plan participants who had previously invested in the RJR
Nabisco Holdings stock now held both NGH and RJR Tobacco Holdings stock.19
The RJR Tobacco Plan, which was the subject of contention in the District Court
case, opened on June 14, 1999, and was intended as a long-term retirement savings
plan including capital appreciation and dividend income.20
Once the spin-off was announced in March 2014, various employees—mostly
from the human resources departments of RJR Nabisco Holdings and its two
subsidiaries—held a series of meetings to determine, among other things, the future
of the divided retirement plans.21 These working groups did not have authority
under the original RJR Nabisco Plan documents nor the later, separate Nabisco and
RJR Tobacco Plan documents to make decisions about any of the three plans.22
Concerned with the high risk of having single, non-employer Nabisco stock in the
RJR Tobacco Plan, and believing that such stock would violate ERISA’s
diversification requirement,23 the working group decided to freeze all Nabisco stock
in the RJR Tobacco accounts at the time of the spin-off.24 The working group also
decided that the two Nabisco funds would be entirely eliminated six months after
the spin-off, with an opportunity for participants to exit the two Nabisco funds any
time before then.25 The RJR Tobacco Employee Benefits Commission (“EBC”)
allegedly concurred with the decisions of the working group, but RJR did not
provide evidence of a vote by the EBC in court.26
Plan documents for the new R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Capital
Investment Plan froze Nabisco funds by amendment,27 and the planned divestment
of the Nabisco funds was promulgated to Plan participants through an official
letter.28 The working group that met in October 1999 to discuss the logistics of the
divestment ultimately decided that the divestment must go forward because many
17. Id.
18. Id. at 653.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 655.
22. Id.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring fiduciaries to discharge duties by “diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so”).
24. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 657.
27. Id. at 657–58.
28. See id. at 657.
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participants had already transferred out of the Nabisco funds at a loss based on the
earlier Plan communications.29 The working group also expressed concern that
unfreezing the funds and not divesting as planned would appear to participants as
encouragement to invest in the Nabisco funds, which were still falling in value at
the time.30 Group members worried that the Nabisco funds would never rebound,
which also motivated divestment.31 The fourth quarter report from 1999, issued just
prior to the rescheduled January 2000 divestment date, showed quarterly losses of
7.7 percent for NA stock and losses of 27.3 percent for NGH stock.32 Analysts were
generally divided as to whether Nabisco stocks would continue to fall, hold
constant, or eventually gain.33 Since the June 1999 spin-off, NGH stock had fallen 60
percent and NA stock had fallen 28 percent.34 Only two months later, a round of
competitive bidding instigated by an unsolicited offer resulted in an infusion of $11
billion in liquid funds.35 When that transaction closed on December 11, 2000, NGH
stock had increased 247 percent and NA stock had increased 82 percent on their
January 31, 2000 share prices.36
On January 27, 2000, just before divestment, Mr. Tatum emailed fiduciaries
requesting cancellation of the proposed sale because he stood to lose 60 percent of
his 401k account.37 In a follow-up meeting, the same fiduciaries relayed that nobody
could stop the divestment.38 After several further communications, Mr. Tatum
claimed on May 1, 2001 that he should receive $30 for each NGH share instead of
the $8 to $9 he received after the January 31, 2000 divestment.39 RJR denied the
claim, citing that Mr. Tatum had the opportunity to individually sell the NGH
funds any time before the divestment.40
With no relief coming from RJR, Mr. Tatum filed suit, claiming RJR breached its
fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to conduct a proper investigation before
divesting the Plan of the Nabisco funds.41 While the District Court found that RJR
had acted imprudently, the Court also found that RJR’s procedural imprudence did
not cause loss to the Plan, thereby exempting RJR from liability.42 Mr. Tatum

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Id. at 662.
Id. at 665.
See id. at 662–63.
Id. at 666.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668.
See id.
See id. at 669.
See id.
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subsequently appealed the District Court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.43

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Though in several earlier cases the Fourth Circuit had addressed whether an ERISA
fiduciary had breached the duty of procedural prudence, the issue of loss causation
had not factored into any of those decisions.44 The issues of assigning the burden of
proof as to loss causation and evaluating whether procedural imprudence caused
plan losses were both novel to the Fourth Circuit. Previously, the Fourth Circuit
had only gone so far as to recognize that loss causation could prove a critical issue
in future ERISA cases.45 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had only
indirectly addressed the issue of loss causation in ERISA litigation, and that
occurred in a decision preceding Tatum by only several months.46 Thus, Tatum
presented the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to pick a side in the
circuit split developing over the loss causation issue.47
A. ERISA’s Duty of Procedural Prudence in the Fourth Circuit
In the 2007 DiFelice v. U.S. Airways case, the Fourth Circuit found that U.S. Airways
had exercised prudence in managing employee retirement funds even after Chapter
11 Bankruptcy had eliminated all U.S. Airways stock from the funds without any
distribution of money to plan participants.48 To reach this decision, the Fourth
Circuit grappled with the issue of outlining the duty of procedural prudence in
ERISA litigation.49 Looking to the ERISA statute, the DiFelice Court recognized the
“requirement that fiduciaries act ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.’”50 To determine whether a fiduciary has violated this
duty, the Fourth Circuit found it must “examine the totality of the circumstances,”
including “plan structure and aims, the disclosures made to participants regarding
the general and specific risks associated with investment in company stock, and the
nature and extent of challenges facing the company that would have an effect on

43. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 2014).
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. See infra Part II.D.
48. See DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 413–14 (4th Cir. 2007).
49. Id. at 419 (Appellant’s employees contended that “the company’s economic peril rendered its decision
to offer the Company Fund to Plan participants a violation of its fiduciary duties to select and hold prudent
investments and to monitor those investments prudently.”).
50. Id. at 422–23 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
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stock price and viability.”51 A court must also determine whether the trustee
engaged in a transaction only after employing “appropriate methods to investigate
the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.”52
Though the DiFelice Court determined procedural prudence by considering the
totality of the circumstances,53 the Fourth Circuit has also recognized several actions
that strongly indicate prudent decision-making by plan fiduciaries. The DiFelice
Court found evidence of procedural prudence where the defendant fiduciary
appointed an independent fiduciary to monitor company stock during a turbulent
period.54 Though not specifically required by ERISA, the Fourth Circuit also found,
in Plasterers v. Pepper, that a “generally recognized duty of a Plan fiduciary under
subsection (B) includes that of investigating and reviewing investment options for
an ERISA plan’s assets.”55
Though a fiduciary’s adherence to its duty of procedural prudence may be
determined by considering its actions and the relevant circumstances, the Fourth
Circuit carefully noted in DiFelice that the prudence of a fiduciary’s actions cannot
be measured by hindsight, “whether this hindsight would accrue to the fiduciary’s
detriment or benefit.”56 Consequently, “the prudent person standard is not
concerned with results,” but tests the fiduciary’s actions in light of the
circumstances at the time of the challenged decision.57 Because the end result is
irrelevant in finding a decision imprudent, a loss of monetary value in a fund is
“neither necessary, nor sufficient, to demonstrate a violation of a fiduciary’s ERISA
duties.”58 The DiFelice Court followed this reasoning in holding that employees
could not demonstrate an imprudent decision simply by showing that U.S. Airways
continued to offer stock during a shaky season for the company that ultimately led
to bankruptcy, regardless of the extent of employees’ financial losses.59 Several years
later in Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit required that “the courts measure section
1104(a)(1)(B)’s ‘prudence’ requirement according to an objective standard,
focusing on a fiduciary’s conduct in arriving at an investment decision, not on its
results, and asking whether a fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to
investigate and determine the merits of a particular investment.”60 Thus, the Fourth

51. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 418.
52. Id. at 420 (quoting Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)).
53. See DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 418.
54. See id. at 421.
55. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2011).
56. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 424.
57. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917–18 (8th
Cir.1994)).
58. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 424.
59. Id. at 425.
60. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 216 (alteration omitted) (quoting In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434
(3d Cir. 1996)).
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Circuit cemented its method for evaluating procedural prudence, but had yet to
address the method for evaluating loss resulting from procedural imprudence.
B. The Fourth Circuit’s Cognizance of the Loss Causation Issue
Though the Fourth Circuit gave ample consideration to which actions satisfy the
duties of procedural prudence when it decided cases like DiFelice, it did not
recognize causation as part of the equation until the 2011 Plasterers decision.61 In
Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit identified the “noticeable gap” between finding a
failure to investigate and/or diversify, and concluding that a trustee is therefore
“liable in damages for the difference between the Plan’s actual and hypothetical
investment values.”62 Ruling that “simply finding a failure to investigate or diversify
does not automatically equate to causation of loss and therefore liability,” the
Fourth Circuit determined that the lower court in Plasterers failed in not
considering whether the breaches of fiduciary duty actually caused loss to the plan
in question.63
By looking to the statute, the Plasterers Court concluded that loss causation must
form part of any claim for damages under ERISA.64 Section 1109(a) dictates that “a
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations,
or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.”65
The Court emphasized the language of “resulting from each such breach,” as
evidence that courts must consider whether a breach actually caused any losses
alleged.66 Affirming that an absence of procedural prudence does not necessarily
equate to causation of loss, the Plasterers Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s
Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co. ruling that a trustee who makes an investment
decision without an investigation is “insulated from liability [under § 1109(a)] if a
hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”67
Though Plasterers introduced the standard for evaluating causation which would
ultimately be at issue in Tatum,68 the Court specifically declined to rule on which
61. See Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 215–16 (trustees arguing that the district court wrongly found them liable for
breach of fiduciary duty because the court failed to determine the trustees had made objectively imprudent
investments).
62. Id. at 217.
63. Id.
64. See id. (“Thus, while certain conduct may be a breach of an ERISA fiduciary’s duties under § 1104, that
fiduciary can only be held liable upon a finding that the breach actually caused a loss to the plan.”).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012).
66. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 217 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012)).
67. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d
915, 919 (8th Cir.1994)).
68. Compare Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2014) (“When the
fiduciary’s conduct fails to meet this standard, and the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of loss, we next
inquire whether the fiduciary’s imprudent conduct caused the loss. For ‘[e]ven if a trustee failed to conduct an
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party should bear the burden of proving causation.69 Otherwise, in the Brink v.
DaLesio decision, the Fourth Circuit placed the burden of proof on the violator of a
fiduciary duty, but not in the specific context of an ERISA suit. 70 This served as the
Tatum Court’s most relevant precedent on the issue.
C. The United States Supreme Court Considers Loss Causation
Two months prior to the Tatum decision, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, in which it held that a fiduciary of an employee
stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) is governed by the same duty of prudence required
of all other ERISA fiduciaries.71 In discussing the duty of prudence, the Court came
close to addressing the issue of loss causation in Tatum, offering some guidance
applicable to the Fourth Circuit. Though it did not directly address the questions of
who should bear the burden of persuasion for causation and which standard courts
should use to evaluate loss causation, the Court did specify that the duty of
prudence does not require an ERISA fiduciary to predict the future performance of
a company’s stock when making investment decisions.72 Similar to the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling in DiFelice, the Court found that a “fiduciary’s ‘fail[ure] to outsmart
a presumptively efficient market . . . is . . . not a sound basis for imposing
liability.’”73
The Court particularly stressed the practical effects of judging the prudence of a
fiduciary’s decision by the outcome of any particular investment, noting that such a
fiduciary “finds himself between a rock and a hard place: If he keeps investing and
the stock goes down he may be sued for acting imprudently in violation of §
1104(a)(1)(B), but if he stops investing and the stock goes up he may be sued for
disobeying the plan documents in violation of § 1104(a)(1)(D).”74 Consequently,
the Court directed that lower courts must consider several factors when interpreting
an ERISA fiduciary’s duties, including “‘competing congressional purposes, such as
investigation before making a decision,’ and a loss occurred, the trustee ‘is insulated from liability . . . if a
hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.’” (quoting Plasterers, 663 F.3d at
218)), with Tatum, 761 F.3d at 374 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“Nothing—no combination of phrases, words,
or syllables—in Plasterers’ amounts to an adoption of a ‘would have’ standard. The quotation the majority
treats as a holding was used merely to demonstrate that ‘causation of loss is not an axiomatic conclusion that
flows from a breach’ of a procedural duty.” (quoting Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218)).
69. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 220 (“We express no opinion as to which approach is appropriate, and leave to
the district court to consider the parties’ arguments upon remand to determine the method most consistent
with the relevant statutory provisions.”).
70. Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 1981), opinion modified and superseded on denial of reh’g,
81-1085, 1982 WL 913725 (4th Cir. 1982) (“It is generally recognized that one who acts in violation of his
fiduciary duty bears the burden of showing that he acted fairly and reasonably.”).
71. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2463 (2014).
72. Id. at 2471–72 (citing Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010)).
73. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2472 (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714
F.3d 980, 992 (7th Cir. 2013)).
74. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2470.
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Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering welfare benefit plans.’”75 While the Dudenhoeffer Court rejected the
argument that fiduciaries should thus enjoy a presumption of prudence, it
simultaneously rejected the notion that mere loss to an investment account
indicates imprudence on the part of account fiduciaries.76
D. The Circuit Split over Assigning the Burden of Proving Loss Causation
In Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, the Supreme Court affirmed that, where the
statute governing a particular question is silent, it is the “ordinary default rule that
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.”77 The Court further
explained that it specifically applied the burden to the plaintiff in securities fraud
cases, equal protection cases, and First Amendment case, among others.78 Yet, the
Court also noted that it had shifted the burden partially or entirely to the defendant
in other cases.79 However, ERISA litigation has not fallen into either category.
Lack of specific precedent from the highest court has resulted in varying rules
among the circuit courts of appeals. The Fifth Circuit uses a three-step process in
any suit for breach of ERISA duties, and in the final step, the “‘burden of persuasion
shifts to the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused by . . . the breach of
duty.’”80 In cases where a breach of fiduciary duty has been demonstrated, the
Second and Sixth Circuits have shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that
the breach did not cause loss.81 On the other hand, the Second Circuit left the
burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that loss resulted from an account
manager’s failure to make “reasonable efforts to remedy the trustees’ breach” where
the trustee allegedly embezzled funds,82 and the Eleventh Circuit placed the burden
of proof as to causation on the plaintiff where a primary fiduciary either
participated in or failed to cure a breach of duty by a delegated fiduciary.83 In Tatum
then, the Fourth Circuit had no clear, consistent precedent from its sister circuits
75. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).
76. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2470–71.
77. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).
78. See id. at 57.
79. See id. (citing FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948) (placing burden of proof on a
defendant seeking the benefit of a statutory exception); Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,
540 U.S. 461, 494 (2004) (assigning burdens of production and persuasion entirely to defendant where a
plaintiff sued to challenge a federal agency’s order)).
80. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Roth v. SawyerCleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1994)).
81. See N.Y. State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund v. Estate of DePerno, 18 F.3d 179, 183 (2d Cir.
1994); Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Gilley, 290 F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2002).
82. See Silverman v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
83. See Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992).
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about how to determine whether the defendant fiduciary caused plan losses,
requiring it to look to general trust law for guidance.84

III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Committee, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court’s holding that RJR breached its duty of procedural
prudence, but vacated the judgment in favor of RJR and remanded the case after
finding the District Court used the wrong standard to evaluate whether RJR’s
imprudent behavior caused loss to the Plan.85 To reach this decision, the Fourth
Circuit resolved two issues in Tatum’s favor: first, “whether the fiduciary engaged in
a reasoned decision[-]making process, consistent with that of a prudent man acting
in [a] like capacity,”86 and, second, “whether the fiduciary’s imprudent conduct
caused the loss.”87 Tatum had argued on appeal that the District Court used the
wrong standard to find that RJR’s breach of its duty of procedural prudence had not
caused the loss.88 RJR contended this point, and raised another issue by challenging
the District Court’s holding that the breaching fiduciary bears the burden of
proving that its breach did not cause plan losses.89
The Fourth Circuit first considered the District Court’s finding that RJR
breached its duty of procedural prudence to plan participants.90 Noting the
extensive factual findings supporting the lower court’s holding, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a breach had occurred.91 In support, it noted the March 1999 working
group’s decision to remove the funds after failing to conduct any research or
investigation into alternatives that might minimize the potential immediate loss to
participants.92 Similarly, the Court affirmed the District Court’s condemnation of
RJR’s lack of research in setting the arbitrary six month timeline, thereby causing
divestment of Nabisco stocks at their lowest value, even though the entire purpose
of the spin-off was to “allow the Nabisco stock a chance to recover from the tobacco
taint.”93 RJR’s failure to conduct sufficient investigation was again highlighted by
the October 1999 meeting, in which RJR executives focused solely on potential
84. See Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, the longrecognized trust law principle—that once a fiduciary is shown to have breached his fiduciary duty and a loss is
established, he bears the burden of proof on loss causation—applies here.”).
85. Id. at 368, 372.
86. Id. at 356 (alteration in original).
87. Id. at 357.
88. Id. (“[Tatum] contends that the court incorrectly considered whether a reasonable fiduciary, after
conducting a proper investigation, could have sold the Nabisco Funds at the same time and in the same manner,
as opposed to whether a reasonable fiduciary would have done so.”).
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 358, 361.
92. Id. at 358.
93. Id. at 359.
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liability without exploring alternatives to the divestment timeline or seeking outside
counsel to analyze the merits of the divestment schedule.94 Finally, the Circuit Court
found that RJR should not have considered its potential liability to plan participants
as a factor in deciding to divest the funds.95
The Fourth Circuit categorically rejected RJR’s contention that it did not breach
its duty, citing RJR’s failure to “present evidence of ‘any process by which
fiduciaries investigated, analyzed, or considered the circumstances regarding the
Nabisco stocks and whether it was appropriate to divest.’”96 RJR’s argument that
non-employer, single-stock funds are per se imprudent, and therefore require
divestment, fared no better.97 The Fourth Circuit ruled that no ERISA-governed
investments are per se prudent or imprudent, but that a totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry must be employed to assess whether plan fiduciaries
exercised prudence in making the investment decision.98 Applying that standard, the
Fourth Circuit asserted that RJR “blink[ed] at reality” in maintaining that it acted
to protect participants and minimize loss when it set an arbitrary timeline for
divestment without investigating prevailing circumstances, thereby ensuring
immediate, permanent losses to plan beneficiaries.99
The Tatum Court next addressed which party in a breach of fiduciary duty
action bears the burden of proof as to loss causation.100 The Fourth Circuit noted its
previous finding in Plasterers v. Pepper that such a breach does not “automatically
equate to causation of loss and therefore liability,”101 but also recognized that
imprudent conduct will usually result in such a loss.102 However, the Plasterers
Court did not need to decide which party bore the burden of proof as to causation,
making this an issue of first impression for the Fourth Circuit in the context of
ERISA litigation.103
The Tatum Court began its analysis by recognizing the default rule that burden
of proof rests with the plaintiff when a statute is silent.104 To affirm the District
Court’s placement of the burden on RJR, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the law of
trusts provides an exception to the default rule: “[W]hen a beneficiary has
succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and that a
related loss has occurred, the burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. (quoting Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 681 (M.D.N.C. 2013).
See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
See id.
Id. (quoting Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2011)).
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 361 (citing Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218).
See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 361.
Id. at 362.
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would have occurred in the absence of the breach.”105 The Fourth Circuit found
analogous support in its Brink v. DaLesio decision, where a district court mistakenly
assigned to the plaintiff the burden of attributing damages to the defendant
fiduciary’s breach in a Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act case.106
The Court also cited amicus Secretary of Labor’s argument that any other approach
would unfairly advantage a defendant “who has already been shown to have
engaged in wrongful conduct, minimizing the fiduciary provisions’ deterrent
effect.”107
For a defendant to carry the burden of proving that its imprudent decisionmaking process did not cause loss, the Tatum Court ruled that the defendant must
show that its ultimate decision was objectively prudent—meaning, the defendant
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a “hypothetical prudent
fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”108 In other words, the Court
found the “inquiry is whether the loss would have occurred regardless of the
fiduciary’s imprudence.”109 By such a showing, a fiduciary like RJR may escape
liability even though it failed to conduct a proper investigation before making an
investment decision.110
Based on this rule, the Tatum Court found that the District Court had used the
wrong standard when it required RJR to prove that a “hypothetical prudent
fiduciary could have decided to eliminate the Nabisco Funds,”111 and ultimately held
that a prudent investor could have inferred the sale was prudent because “evidence
did not ‘compel a decision to maintain the Nabisco Funds in the Plan.’”112 Instead,
the District Court should have considered whether the evidence proved, more likely
than not, that a prudent fiduciary would have divested the Nabisco Funds in the
same time period and manner as RJR.113 Citing the Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit found the distinction in language critical because “‘could’ describes what is
merely possible, while ‘would’ describes what is probable.”114 While use of “would”
involves prediction based on custom or common occurrence, the word “could”
encompasses the most remote possibilities.”115
RJR argued that even under the “would have” standard, it should escape liability
because a prudent fiduciary would have eliminated the Nabisco Funds from the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (2012)).
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 363–64.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 364.
Id. (quoting Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 690 (M.D.N.C. 2013)).
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364 (quoting Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 686).
See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364.
Id. at 365 (citing Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 187–88 (2008)).
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 365.
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plan due to their high-risk nature, thereby making application of the District
Court’s “could have” standard harmless.116 Rejecting this argument, the Tatum
Court found the risk of an investment insufficient to label it per se prudent or
imprudent.117 Instead, a court must consider the “character and aim of the
particular plan and decision at issue and the circumstances prevailing at the time.”118
Under that standard, the Fourth Circuit found that RJR’s failure to follow
governing plan documents, as mandated by ERISA, would be more compelling in
determining causation than the high-risk nature of the funds.119 Thus, the District
Court’s application of the “could have” standard was not harmless, and the Fourth
Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether RJR could
present additional evidence to meet its burden of proof as to causation under the
“would have” standard.120
In the lone dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the majority
ruling on both issues: assigning burden of proof as to loss causation and the
standard by which to assess loss causation.121 First, Judge Wilkinson argued that, in
Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit had already “noted that ‘simply finding a failure to
investigate or diversify does not automatically equate to causation of loss and
therefore liability.’”122 Further, he noted the Plasterers rule’s conformity to ERISA
itself, which requires that “the losses ‘result from’ the breach of fiduciary duty.”123
This and other language in ERISA, Judge Wilkinson argued, provides no indication
that Congress intended to shift the burden of proof for loss causation to potential
defendants.124 Finally, he contended that the precedent relied upon by the majority
to shift the burden could be distinguished as either cases of self-dealing or cases
focusing on a different step of ERISA litigation, such as the extent of liability rather
than the existence of loss causation.125
Second, Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the majority’s decision to assess loss
causation from ERISA investment decisions through the lens of what a reasonably
prudent investor would have done.126 He contended that the definition of the
“would have” standard—whether or not a reasonably prudent fiduciary would,
more likely than not, have made the safe decision127—inherently shifts the evaluative
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
2011)).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 366.
Id. at 366–67.
Id. at 367 (quoting DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 420 (4th Cir. 2007)).
See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 367.
Id. at 368.
See id. at 372–73 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 374 (quoting Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir.
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 375 (alteration omitted) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)).
Tatum, 761 F.3d at 375.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
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standard from objective prudence to relative prudence.128 Judge Wilkinson assessed
that such a standard unfairly requires a fiduciary to always make the “best possible
decision,”129 when meeting such a strict standard is not required by ERISA and
when investing is “as much art as science” because there are always many
investment options with many unknowable outcomes.130

IV. ANALYSIS
RJR appealed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, but
the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2015.131 Because there is no
indication that RJR refiled its petition, the Fourth Circuit’s rulings in Tatum remain
untouched, though future litigation may well threaten their longevity. This
prediction rests on two observations: first, that requiring a defendant fiduciary to
bear the burden of proof as to loss causation does not comport with the
congressional intent of ERISA, as evidenced in the plain language of that statute;
and, second, that the “would have” standard for assessing causation does not align
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dudenhoeffer.
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Burden Shifting Framework Regarding Loss Causation does
not Comport with ERISA
Due to the circuit split over which party bears the burden of proof as to loss
causation in ERISA litigation, a future Supreme Court decision on the issue would
have wider impact than solely affirming or overruling the Tatum case.132 Should the
issue ever come before the Supreme Court, that Court will likely overrule Tatum
because, based on both the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit’s default rules for
assigning burden of proof regarding loss causation to plaintiffs,133 and the statutory
language of ERISA in 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a),134 the Tatum Court should not have ruled
that this burden of proof rests with the defendant fiduciary.

128. Id. at 378.
129. Id. (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 377–78.
131. See RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.).
132. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
133. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–57 (2005); Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377
F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (“When a statute is
silent, the burden of proof is normally allocated to the party initiating the proceeding and seeking relief.”).
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (“(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal
of such fiduciary.”).
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As the Tatum Court recognized,135 the default rule is that “plaintiffs bear the
burden of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims,” and therefore
“bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.”136 Though the Supreme Court noted
the “ordinary default rule, of course, admits of exceptions,”137 the Tatum Court
erred when it found that the law of trusts provides one such exception for claims of
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.138 The Supreme Court found that the
exceptions are “extremely rare,” and that the general default rule will be applied
absent a “reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise.”139 The Fourth Circuit
provided no justification as to why Congress would intend the Tatum rule, cited
from the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,140 to provide an exception in this type of
case.141 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recognition that “ERISA’s standards and
procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the
common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection,”142 meant
that the Tatum Court could not blindly assume, as it did, that the Restatement of
Trusts should govern.
Looking to the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1109, which establishes the claim for
liability, there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended for the defendant to
bear the burden of proof as to causation. While the prerequisite of any § 1109 claim
is breach of the “responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter,” there is only liability for “losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach.”143 Shifting the burden of causation to the defendant, therefore, not
only violates the default rule that a plaintiff bear the burden of proving essential
aspects of its claim,144 but exempts the plaintiff from having to prove the only
requirement for liability under the statute.
The Tatum rule, then, goes further than the Plasterers observation that
“imprudent conduct will usually result in a loss.”145 The Tatum Court’s rule as to the
burden of proving loss causation grants a default victory to any plaintiff that can
show imprudent conduct by a fiduciary, regardless of whether there is an
135. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (majority opinion) (“Generally, of course, when a statute is silent, the
default rule provides that the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff.”).
136. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56–57.
137. Id. at 57.
138. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362.
139. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57.
140. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (2012) (“[W]hen a
beneficiary has succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and that a related loss has
occurred, the burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the
breach.”)).
141. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (claiming only that “one such exception arises under the common law of
trusts”).
142. Id. at 357 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (emphasis added).
144. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56–57.
145. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2011).
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accompanying harm. As the dissent argued, default monetary liability does not
comport with the statute’s separate offering of “other equitable or remedial relief,
including removal of such fiduciary,”146 which is predicated solely on showing a
breach of “responsibilities, obligations, or duties.”147 Causation of loss is the
essential element of a claim for damages under § 1109.148 The Court should not have
assigned the burden of proof to the defendant—essentially giving default damages
to the plaintiff—absent compelling Congressional justification.
Practically, this rule makes the Fourth Circuit more plaintiff-friendly in suits for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Per Tatum, the Fourth Circuit requires
nothing more from plaintiffs than showing imprudent decision-making processes
on the part of a defendant and a prima facie showing of loss.149 Alternatively, the
legal landscape has become more difficult for ERISA fiduciaries in the Fourth
Circuit who now face monetary liability if they cannot disprove that their decisions
caused losses to the plan.150 The dissent noted the likely increase in the amount of
ERISA claims in the Fourth Circuit, due to the relaxed burden of proof on
plaintiffs.151 Compounded by the loss causation standard adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, this rule will require ERISA fiduciaries seeking to avoid costly settlements
or judgments to exercise extreme caution in making plan decisions, likely inhibiting
fiduciary willingness to make some investment decisions actually beneficial to plan
participants.152 Such circumstances create an imbalance of what the Supreme Court
recognized as the “competing congressional purposes” of ERISA; namely,
“Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”153 Thus, should the Supreme Court
ever find that the Fourth Circuit’s burden of proof assignment disproportionately
increases legal and administrative costs for plan fiduciaries, it will have even more
reason to overturn the Tatum rule.

146. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 376 (alteration omitted) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
149. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 363 (majority opinion).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 381 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s approach will wreak havoc . . . ,
encouraging opportunistic litigation to challenge even the most sensible financial decisions.”).
152. See id. at 383 (“[F]ar from safeguarding the assets of ERISA-plan participants, the litigation spawned by
the majority will simply drive up plan-administration and insurance costs. It will discourage plan fiduciaries
from fully diversifying plan assets. It will contribute to a climate of second-guessing prudent decisions at the
point of market shift. It will disserve those whom ERISA was intended to serve when fiduciaries are hauled into
court for seeking, sensibly, to safeguard retirement savings.”).
153. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470 (2014) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).

234

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Jared Burtner
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Dudenhoeffer Indicates Disagreement with the
“Would Have” Standard for Evaluating Loss Causation
In Dudenhoeffer, the Supreme Court did not specifically address the standard for
evaluating loss causation in cases of procedural imprudence when it concluded that
the law does not create a special presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries.154
However, the Court’s reasoning in Dudenhoeffer suggests it would likely overrule
the “would have” standard of the Tatum decision if the issue is ever brought before
the Court.155 Not only would this reverse the Fourth Circuit standard, but it would
provide guidance to lower courts on an issue that currently lacks clear precedent.156
In Dudenhoeffer, the respondent based its claim on a reasoning of causation
similar to the “would have” standard adopted by the Tatum Court.157 The
respondent argued that the petitioner’s decision to allow “investment in Fifth Third
Stock even during the time that the stock price was declining in value as a result of
the collapse of the housing market” was imprudent because “a prudent fiduciary
facing similar circumstances would not have stood idly by as the Plan’s assets were
decimated.”158 The Court found this appeal to a “would have” standard of causation
did not comport with an objective reliance on market prices, where ERISA
fiduciaries, or any other investors who can “reasonably see ‘little hope of
outperforming the market . . . based solely on their analysis of publicly available
information,’ may, as a general matter, likewise prudently rely on the market
price.”159 Where a stock is publicly traded, like the various Nabisco stocks at issue in
Tatum,160 the Supreme Court found that “allegations that a fiduciary should have
recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or
undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of
special circumstance.”161
The Fourth Circuit found RJR fiduciaries liable for causing plan losses by
divesting the Nabisco stocks without showing that, more likely than not, a prudent
fiduciary would have done the same.162 While the RJR fiduciaries may not have
exercised procedural prudence,163 their decision to divest was certainly founded on
publicly available information about the market price of the stocks.164 Noting the
154. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471.
155. See id.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364 (majority opinion).
158. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471.
159. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S.
Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)).
160. Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 665 (M.D.N.C. 2013).
161. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471.
162. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364.
163. See id. at 358.
164. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 666.
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low price of the Nabisco stocks, RJR fiduciaries worried that they would never
rebound.165 RJR chose to divest the Nabisco funds because the value of the stocks
was still falling,166 essentially relying on what the Dudenhoeffer Court described as
the “security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light
of all public information.”167 In other words, RJR relied on publicly available market
information to make the divestment decision, meaning that the Supreme Court
would find Tatum’s claim “implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of
special circumstances”168—an exception the Court did not develop further.169
In terms of the “could have” versus “would have” debate, the Supreme Court’s
objective test of reliance on market pricing suggests the Court is far more in-line
with a “could have” standard for evaluating loss causation. If “a fiduciary usually ‘is
not imprudent to assume that a major stock market . . . provides the best estimate
of the value of the stocks traded on it that is available to him,’” then the only
imprudent investment decision is one based on something other than market
pricing.170 Thus, the emphasis is not on the decision reached, but on the means of
reaching the decision. This takes into account the variety of investment options
different security fiduciaries could make based on the same information, as
evidenced by the Fourth Circuit’s observation that analysts were generally divided
as to whether Nabisco stock would continue to fall, hold constant, or eventually
gain.171 Consequently, if the burden is on RJR to show that its procedural
imprudence did not cause loss, RJR would need to show that a procedurally
prudent fiduciary could reach the same decision on the same publicly available
market information. Alternatively, if the burden rests on Tatum to show that RJR’s
procedural imprudence caused plan loss, Tatum would need to show that a
procedurally prudent fiduciary could not reach the same decision from the same
publicly available market information. As the dissent in Tatum noted, the Fourth
Circuit “seeks to shift the standard of objective prudence to one of relative
172
prudence.”

165. Id. at 662.
166. Id. at 661.
167. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471 (2014) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014)).
168. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471.
169. Id. at 2472 (“We do not here consider whether a plaintiff could nonetheless plausibly allege
imprudence on the basis of publicly available information by pointing to a special circumstance affecting the
reliability of the market price as ‘an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public
information,’ that would make reliance on the market’s valuation imprudent.” (quoting Halliburton, 134 S. Ct.
at 2411)).
170. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (quoting Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404,
408 (7th Cir. 2006)).
171. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 662–63.
172. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 378 (4th Cir. 2014) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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The Dudenhoeffer Court further supported the preeminence of relying on
publicly available market information when it rejected any requirement for
fiduciaries to use insider information.173 Thus, any inside knowledge about pending
competitive bidding or the unsolicited offer to purchase the company, regardless of
the positive effect either might have on the Nabisco stock, would be irrelevant in
assessing RJR’s liability.174 So, based on Dudenhoeffer, to justify divestment, RJR only
needed to look at the consistent devaluing of the Nabisco stock, and the fact that
others analyzing the market could conclude that the stock might fall further.175
The Supreme Court would also likely overrule the Fourth Circuit’s “would have”
standard due to inconsistency with the ERISA statute. In espousing a “would have”
standard for assessing causation, the Fourth Circuit mischaracterizes the “could
have” standard as providing little protection to plan participants by justifying a
fiduciary’s decision upon showing that at least one other fiduciary could arrive at
the same decision.176 ERISA requires fiduciaries to act “with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”177 As the Tatum dissent noted, the
District Court’s “could have” standard “would not be satisfied merely by imagining
any single hypothetical fiduciary that might have come to the same decision.
Rather, it asks whether hypothetical prudent fiduciaries consider the path chosen to
have been a reasonable one.”178 Therefore, the Supreme Court is likely to eventually
reject the “would have” standard per its reasoning in Dudenhoeffer, without
contradicting ERISA’s stated purpose to protect beneficiaries by “assuring the
equitable character of [employee benefit plans] and their financial soundness.”179

V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit’s Tatum decision could have served as a catalyst for the Supreme
Court to not only correct bad case law, but to resolve a circuit split and provide
needed guidance on rules that significantly impact ERISA’s application to litigation
over alleged instances of procedural imprudence. The Fourth Circuit’s decision to
depart from the default rule and assign burden of proof regarding loss causation to
the defendant instead of the plaintiff does not align with the substance of the ERISA
statute, nor with the typical assignment of that burden in both Supreme Court and

173. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2472.
174. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 666.
175. See id. (noting that since the spin-off of the preceding June, NGH had fallen 60 percent and NA had
fallen 28 percent).
176. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 365 (majority opinion).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).
178. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 377 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012).
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Fourth Circuit precedent.180 Furthermore, the Tatum Court’s adoption of a “would
have” standard for evaluating whether procedural imprudence caused loss to a
retirement plan does not fit with the Supreme Court’s objective, market price-based
analysis in Dudenhoeffer.181 Consequently, interested parties could justifiably expect
the Supreme Court to overrule the Fourth Circuit on both points should the issues
ever reach the Supreme Court in a future case.

180.
181.
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